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ABSTRACT

This independent study is an attempt to analyze the regulation
of business in the United States of America.

Its objective is to go

back in American history to find and describe the legislative origins
of government regulation of business and trace its growth to the
present.

Using the specific areas of price, transport, and public

utilities, the impact of regulation on business as it is manifested in
todays modern environment will be analyzed.

viii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
Introduction and Scope
The initial chapter to this paper will state the problem that this
paper will address.

A justification of reasons for selecting this

problem and the major objectives of the paper will be stated.

A step-

by-step account of the plan of presentation of this paper will be laid
out so as to give the reader some idea of the plan of discussion of the
problem and the fulfillment of the stated objectives.

Lastly, a descrip-

tion of the research methodology employed in this paper will be discussed.
The scope of the paper is somewhat limited.

It is concerned with

giving the reader a basic understanding of how regulation originated
in the latter part of the 19th Century, and tracing its subsequent growth
to the Post World War II period.

With this background information

established, the impact of business regulation in its modern, manifested
form is examined in the specific areas of price, transport, and public
utilities.
The Problem
According to an anonymous midwestern gubernatorial candidate, the
role of the federal government is to "deliver the mail, defend the shores,
and get the hell out of my life."

1

The Constitution does give the federal

1R.F. Magill, "Presentation For Survival In a Regulated World,"
Business Horizons, (February 1980), pp. 75-81.

(

2

goverrnnent the power to regulate business.

The problem is, how to

assure that government regulation is limited to that which is necessary
and beneficial.

When does government cross that fine line from legiti-

mate regulation to unnecessary overregulation which inhibits efficiency,
lowers production, ans stifles growth?
To find a solution to this problem past business regulation will be
examined.

What precepts was it based on, how much of it, and what forms

did it exist?

What was the intended purpose, aim and objective compared

to its present day results?
Justification and Objectives
The major reason behind my selecting the topic of business regulation was to identify where, when and how regulation began, and then trace
its phenominal growth to the present.

Using the three specific areas

mentioned above the reader can compare the initial size and intent of early
regulation to its modern size and content.

The objective being to encour-

age the readers to decide in their own minds where that fine line between
necessary legitimate regulation and unnecessary overregulation exists.
Plan of Presentation
The plan of presentation is two fold.
evolution of regulation will occur.

First, a description the

This will include legal and legisla-

tive foundations of business regulation as well as the government perceived need of regulation.

In addition, an examination of business

regulation in its infancy beginning with the Granger Movement and
culminating in the Antitrust legislation will take place.
Second, the analysis of business regulation will be limited to
three major areas.

The first being Price Regulation which will include

3

the principles of price control, an explanation of the impact of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, and the impact of wartime price
regulation.

Secondly, regulation will be examined in the transport

industry to include an examination of the federal and stat~ regulation

•

of the transport industry.

Lastly, an analysis will be conducted of

Public Utilities Regulation to include federal and state involvement
in this area.
Thirdly, there will be an analysis of the overall impact of this
legislation on business.

This will include its impact on costs, growth

and production on both large and small business.
The conclusions section of this paper will deal with the implications of this business regulation.

Alternatives and possible solutions

to the problem will be pointed out and then the paper will be drawn to a
close with some conclusions.

Research Methodology
The research methodology employed in this paper is an in depth
review and analysis of the current and past literature and information
available on the subject of business regulation.

The secondary

research employed will consist of published sources materials including
articles by noted academicians and practicioners in the business related
fields of management, finance, marketing, and accounting.
encompasses the period from the mid 1800s to the present.

This research

CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATION
Introduction
In this chapter a discussion of the evolution of business regulation
will take place by first describing and analyzing the original foundation
of government regulation set forth in the Common Law of the land as interpreted by the judicial branch of government.

Secondly, to point out and

state the reasons why there is a legitimate need for government regulation of business in certain areas.

Thirdly, to describe the early legis-

lative regulation of business culminating in the Antitrust Laws.

My

purpose in describing this legislation is to show that what was formerly
the seeds of regulation incorporated in the Common Law that was sparingly
interpreted by the judicial branch of government has now grown into concrete legislation created by Congress having the force of statute:Jaw
behind it.
Legal and Judicial Foundations of Regulation
The foundation of the legal system of the United States is the
common law.
law.

There are three distinct, but basic features of the common

They are judicial precedent, trial by jury, and the doctrine of

the supremacy of the law.

Common law can be referred to as that part

of the law of the land which has developed over many years without the
help of legislation, and can be found in court decisions handed down

5

over the years.

Common law is the traditional part of the law of land

and distinct from statute law.

Thus, if a question as to the interpre-

tation of a present law, or an answer to a new problem is needed, a
search through past court decisions occurs to determine just what the
courts have said the law constitutes in that given situation.

When a

court established a new rule through a court decision, that rule now
becomes the law of the land under common law.

Changing times have

brought new concepts and modified old ones in the interpretation of
common law.

Consequently, common law has grown, developed, and changed

in substance over the years.
Under common law citizens can engage in any type of business.
Individual responsibility is the major characteristic of business
operations undertaken under the provisions of common law.
liability is unlimited.

As a result,

Each individual has equal responsibility and

power before the law.
Over the many centuries that common law has developed, extensive
rules of business conduct have evolved.

When not specifically super-

ceded by statute laws, these common law rules are prevalent.

Even with

the existence of statute law, common law concepts are vital to the
terminology of law as well as the interpretation of law.

Defined it states,

"all agencies of government are found to act in accordance with
general legal principles, and not according to arbitrary will.
As a consequence, the acts of agencies of government are constantly subject to scrutiny in ordinary legal procedures before
the regular courts of the land." 2
Oh, if that were only true today!

The meaning of the above statement

2Dudley E. Pegrum, Public Regulation of Business, (Homewood,Ill:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc, 1959) p. 23.

11
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will become very important later in this paper when the pros and cons
of regulations are discussed.

The doctrine of the supremacy of the law

has become part of the guarantee of personal and property rights, and
has acted as a strong safeguard against the ever increasing encroachment
of public authority.
However, common law over the years has also emerged as a base for
the regulation of business by government.
have emerged.

They are:

Four major justifications

(1) restraint of trade, (2) conspiracy by

business to monopolize, (3) unfair competition, and (4) the basic right
of government to regulate granted by the Constitution.

The first three

define the rules of conduct for a competitive free enterprise environment.

It is the fourth justification that I will deal with in depth,

in the remainder of this paper.

I do concede that under the common law

there is a base for the government to regulate business.

However, the

size, detail, and form of that regulation is open for debate.
It is the function of the courts to interpret the laws and to
settle litigation.

Unfortunately, the role of the courts in this nation

with respect to the regulation of business is far greater than the
judiciary of any other nation.
reasons.

This has come about due to two basic

First, is the doctrine of judicial supremacy in which the

Constitution gave the Supreme Court a leading role in the determination
of public policy through their court decisions.

Second, Congress has

given the courts the important responsibility of interpreting very
broad legislation, and of developing public policy under it.

With

respect to regulation, the courts have four major functions.

First,

the interpretation of the Constitution.

Second, interpretation to the

7

protection of personal and property rights.
of regulatory legislation.

Third, the enforcement

Fourth, the settling of disputes arising

from enforcement by commissions.
Need for Regulation
So far I have established that the government has a right to
regulate based on common law, and the Constitution.

The next question

to be answered is there a legitimate need for regulation.

There are

three basic legitimate needs for the regulation of business.

They are

the enhancement of competition, to prevent and to control monopolies,
and to correct imperfections in competition.
To enhance competition, business regulation functions by setting
the rules and conditions of competition and also to insure that these
rules are equally applied to everyone.

Its objective, to protect law-

abiding entrepreneurs from intimidation and fraud.

Vernon Mund sums

it up this way.
"The 'right to compete' - freedom of enterprise - may be
defined as the right of producers to follow an occupation
of their own choice without interference or dictation by
other producers or by government. With freedom of enterprise, society is given wide opportunity for having its
various desires satisfied.

Human and material resources

tend to be allocated in places and at times where they are
most urgently needed. Maximum production is promoted, At
the same time, the selfish designs of individual producers
are held in check by the freedom of entry for newcomers and
by the opportunity of consumers to turn to alternative sources
of supply, 11 3
Regulation is also used to legitimately control monopolies.
all areas of industry have some form of monopoly.

3 vernon A. Mund, Government and Business.
and Row Publishers), 1965, p. 26.

Almost

It is not possible

(New York: Harper
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to eliminate them completely.

Monopoly is what you might call the

inescapable part of the structure of business.

The bigger a firm gets

the more money it takes in, and the more profits it earns.
competition is eliminated, profits could be unlimited.

If the

Thus, private

enterprise should not be given the leeway to do whatever they deem
necessary to gain control of a market.

In many instances, decisions on

business policy directly affect the public interest.

Thus, no one

group should dictate what is in the public interest.

Some other entity,

in the absence of competition, must speak for the public good.
entity of course is government speaking through regulation.

That

Mund

summarizes the need for regulation to prevent monopolies.
"There is the constant danger that the opportunity to make
profit may create in some enterprises a moral blindspot, an
area in their activities which is not controlled by their usual
ethical standards. Persons seeking monopoly control, employing
false and mendacious advertising, or exploiting labor are often
men who are highly esteemed and respected in public life."4
This does not mean that all businessmen are self-serving, money hungry,
stop at nothing finatics out to make a buck at everyones expense.

It

only means that there are a few businessmen, that if backed into a
corner will resort to unethical and immoral methods to achieve a
desired end.

It is the role of government to list and enforce standards

of business conduct and rules of fair play that are conducive to the
maximum amount of competition possible.
Regulation In Its Infancy
The first attempts to regulate business were made by several

4 Ibid, p. 24.

]l
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midwestern states via the Granger laws in the mid 1800s to regulate the
railroad industry.

The major weakness of these laws were that they had

no power or control over interstate conunerceo

Subsequently, Trusts were

formed by firms to avoid regulation and enhance their monopolistic position.

Examples of these include the Standard Oil Trust, the Sugar Trusts,

and other agreements to include meat, steak, and linseed oil producers.
Eventually, some federal action had to be taken.

Consequently, in 1890

the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed and signed into law.

The objective

of the Act was to eliminate the growth of monopolies and enhance a
competitive environment.

To achieve this objective the common law doc-

trines of restraint of trade and monopoly were incorporated into the
Act.

It was worked in such a way to cover the broadest spectrum insur-

ing that all attempts to thwart competition would be covered.

W.H. Ham-

ilton is very forceful in his description of the Act.
"The Sherman Act is thus in accord with the great American
tradition ..• In any venture into regulation every party has
the right to insist that it be accorded an equivalent for
the protection of the open market which he is called upon to
surrender. In a world where the unknown crowds upon us,
public policy can have no endearing ultimate. For its guidance,
we may discover a more reasonable scheme Of values than we know;
but until that time, the objectives of the common right and the
Sherman Act must continue to direct. However, the pattern of
industrial government is modified, the ideal they embody will
remain the reference for economic justice. 11 5
While the Sherman Antitrust Act laid down the broad foundation for
statutory control of private enterprise the Clayton Antitrust Act of
1914 had as its objective to eliminate monopoly at its conception.
This was accomplished by eliminating price discrimination as a means

5

william H. Hamilton, Common Right, Due Process and Antitrust: Law
and Contemporary Problems, (Durham NC: Duke Univ Press, 1940), pp. 24-41.

I
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of achieving monopoly.
competiting firm.

It prohibited firms from acquiring stock in a

No one person could be director of more than one

corporation with assets of over one million dollars.

Leaders of the

large firms were made responsible for corporate violations of the penal
provisions of the Antitrust laws.

The Federal Trade Commission and the

Justice Department were responsible for the enforcement of these laws.
The Kefauvre-Celler Act of 1950 arose when the Supreme Court made
part of the Clayton Act ineffective.

It also amended the Clayton Act

prohibiting any corporation engaged in commerce from acquiring, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation.
Its secondary objective was to put a stop to the growing number of
mergers they felt would lessen competition.
Up to now I have discussed the provisions of the antitrust laws and
their regulations.

Enforcement of those laws and regulations is a bit

more difficult than their creation.

Widespread disillusionment was

prevalent in the early 1900s over the enforcement of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.

Business wanted more precise

definition of what these

acts covered, others believed that court interpretations were not in
line with the intent of Congress.

Both agreed that some type of admin-

istration body was needed to develop, interpret, and enforce the law.
Tbus, in 1914 the Federal Trade Commission Act was signed by President
Wilson.

Tbe law provided for the creation of a commission of five

members appointed by the President to seven year terms, no more than
three could be of the same political party.

The commission was given

broad investigative powers to enforce the antitrust laws.

It had a

duty to consumers as well as producers to insure a business environment

existed whereby the broadest spectrum of competition could flourish.

11

The Wheeler Lee Act amended the Federal Trade Commission Act by
making it unlawful to use unfair methods of competition as well as
unfair outs or deceptive practices in commerce.

It gave the Federal

Trade Commission power to discontinue any practice it deemed injurious
to the consumer, even though competition was not affected.

It also

made false advertising a criminal act.
It should be noted that Common Law Doctrines and the Antitrust
Laws are just broad foundations upon which government is to expand its
regulatory base.

We shall see just how far that expansion grows in the

remainder of this paper.

ffl.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE MANIFESTATION OF REGULATION

Introduction
Up to this point, this paper has examined the Common Law origins
of business regulation which was the building block for future governmental interference in business affairs.

Secondly, a description of the

legitimate need for business regulation has been presented.

Picking up

on the Common Law foundation, regulation has been traced from its infancy
to its culmination in the Antitrust legislation.
In this chapter, three specific areas of regulation will be examined:
Price, Transport, and Public Utilities.

The impact of any of the pre-

viously discussed legislation (Antitrust) will be tied in where it is
applicable.

More importantly, the impact of the specific regulatory

legislation and actions affecting each of the three major areas will
be discussed.
The examination of Price Regulation will include its definition
along with all its established forms.

The description of Price Regula-

tion will cover its specific legislative origins and its growth through
the World War II period where the regulation of price was at its zenith.
In the Regulation of Transport a narrowing of the scope to include
an examination of regulation in the railroad industry will occur.

The

Granger Laws will be discussed in more detail than in Chapter Two to
the point of relating new specific regulatory legislation having

-- - - - - - - - -
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significant impact on the railroad industry.
In the discussion of Public Utilities Regulation a relationship
between the Common Law impact and the federal, state, and local impact
on the industry will be described.

Specific examples will be used to

analyze the impact of both the state and federal regulatory commissions.
Regulation of Price
Pegrum describes how price regulations come about when he states:
"Price regulation in a private enterprise economy arises as a result

of the inability of competition, without any public intervention
with regard to specific prices, to perform adequately the task of
bringing about the most economical allocation and utilization of
resources. 116

The basic objective of price regulation in this country is to bring about
the allocation and maximum utilization of resources which existing levels
of economic competition cannot bring about.

Minimum price controls are

imposed to protect the producer against some effects of competition with
the intent of aiding the industry or increase overall industry-wide competition.

Maximum price controls are imposed to protect the consumer.

The thinking behind this is that it prevents a producer or the seller
from exploiting the consumer by putting a price on a product that is too
high compared to its cost of production.

In addition to a minimum or

maximum price, a regulatory agency may set a precise price on a product.
This consists of a determination of the firms profits that it is permitted to receive, as well as the price of its product.

The purpose of

this type of price regulation is to protect the consumer against possible exploitation due to the lack of competitive alternative products.
Public price regulation is in essence a substitute for competition.

6Ibid, Pegrum, p. 707.

I
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Since price regulation presupposes that the market is unable to
determine fair and equitable prices, then what is a fair price?

There

are three basic approaches that a regulatory body may take in determining
a fair price.

One approach is to establish a minimum price.

As defined

earlier a minimum price has the objective of protecting the producer.
They can be established for three basic purposes.
used to combat price discrimination.

First, they may be

Examples of this would be to

limit such practices as quantity discounts and freight absorption.
Second, minimum prices are used in the transportation industry where
minimum rates are set by a public commission.

Third, to relieve certain

depressed industries such as agriculture by establishing firm price
supports. 7

It should be noted that effective minimum price fixing

includes some form of production control to limit supply in industries
with more than one producer to keep the pressure on lowering prices due
to excess supply.
As stated earlier, the prime objective of imposing maximum prices
is the protection of the consumer.

Its most effective use has been in

the areas of transport and public utilities.

Maximum price fixing in

a competitive industry means that maximum prices must apply to all
producers.

Consequently, this inhibits the built in rationing function

of prices because prices are fixed for the industry by an outside source.
Also maximum prices may be set to limit price advances to allow supply
to catch up with demand.

In general, maximum prices are a very ineffec-

tive means for property channeling the allocation and effective utilization of our nation's resources because it will create an imbalance

7 Ibid, Pegrum pp. 207-231.
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between supply and demand by restricting output as well as forcing
the sale of products at a price buyers may not be willing to pay.
In establishing precise prices a regulatory body must embody the
tenants of both minimum and maximum price fixing.

In other words, a

firm must be allowed such a return that it is able to obtain the
necessary economic resources to supply customers the products they
desire at prices covering the costs of the product and a minimum profit.
Thus, a regulatory body must assess a firm's total revenue required to
recover the cost of the product in addition to a reasonable profit.
This is much easier said than done given the highly volatile economic
conditions our national economy faces in this century.

Now that a base for the types and means of price regulation has
been established the attention of the paper will turn to the actual
legislative beginnings of price regulation.

The growth of regulation

will be traced from the National Industrial Recovery Act through World
War II.
On

June 16, 1933 the National Industrial Recovery Act was passed

to combat the effects of the Great Depression.

Its objective was to

bring about a recovery by increasing consumer purchasing power thus
increasing consumer demand to buy American products, resulting in
putting more Americans back to work.

Increasing the wage rates would

increase wage payments giving more money to the wage earners for spending.

Lastly, destructive competition was prevented by establishing

minimum prices.

To bring all of this about, some form of production

control was required.

Section 1 of the Act describes its purpose.

"The purpose of the Act, set forth in Section 1, was to
remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and
foreign commerce, to provide for the general welfare by

16
promoting the organization of industry for the purpose
of cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and
maintain united action of labor and management under
adequate governmental sanction and supervision, to

eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the
fullest possible utilization of the existing productive
capacity of industries, to avoid undue restruction of
production, to increase the consumption of industrial
and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power,
to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standard
of labor and otherwise to rehabititate industry, and to
conserve national resources.

To achieve the objectives,

the President was empowered to delegate any of his functions
and powers as he saw fit and to establish an industrial planning and research agency to assist him in carrying out the
task."8
Specifically, the President had the power to impose codes of fair
competition upon industries, and individual business.

The President

had the power to forbid anyone from engaging in interstate commerce.
Through the National Recovery Administration, authorized to be set
up by the Act, a total of 557 codes of fair competition were imposed
upon business.

The effect of these codes was to diminish the reliance

upon private initiative and competition in favor of a much increased
governmental role.

All of the codes contained severe restrictions on

the pricing policies of firms.
of production capacity.

They also controlled the use and size

Some codes limited the number of hours a plant

could operate, production quotes were assigned, others prohibited
purchases of new equipment.
areas a firm could serve.
the codes.
stitutional.

Limits were also put on the geographical
Minimum price fixing was used in most of

In 1935 the Supreme Court struck down the Act as unconHowever, specific follow-on legislation by both federal

and state government did continue some of the precepts of the Act.
The problem with the Act is that it was based on a war type of

8 1bid, Pegrum p. 215.

' I
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environment with too many restraints&

In a war environment, restraint

and focusing of resources on limited objectives is needed to achieve
the primary objective of victory over the enemy.

To achieve victory,

the economic resources of the nation are severely strained.
immediately needed for the war are put on the back burner.
for the short term disregarding the long term costs.

Goods not
It is geared

To successfully

fight a depression you must do just the opposite, if you want to maintain a private enterprise economic systemo

Production requires stimula-

tion not restrainto

One example of price controls on an industry with numerous producers is through the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.

It set up a seven

member board (2 representatives from coal operators, 2 from miners,
3 from the public).
prices for soft coal.

It had the power to establish minimum and maximum
It established minimum prices for soft coal in

every region of the nation, every market, at every season, for every

type of use.

Some 400,000 separate prices were set.

years to accomplish.

It took three

Then World War 11 came along, the demand for

coal sky-rocketed, which eliminated the need for minimum prices.

One

can only conject what the further results of the Act might have been
had not the war come along.
If anyone could make a strong case for total economic management
of an industry or an economy by government it would be during a World
War.

As stated earlier, production must be directed at the primary

objective of winning the war.

The tremendous need for weapons,

materials, etc., require that the entire economy be geared for victory,
and victory only, everything else is secondary.

Production must be

centered on the essentials, not the non-essentials.

No longer is the

ITT
I
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individual consumer the judge of what is essential through his purchases
of goods.

Now, government is the judge.

Consumer goods take a back

seat to the more pressing war objectives.

The peace time price system

is totally unable to quickly make the massive transformation of a consumer oriented economy to a war oriented economy.

Government must force-

fully comple this transformation by channeling resources, regardless of
the price, in the proper production channels.
economy the government controls production.

Therefore, in a war
Manpower is allocated by

government between military priorities and consumer priorities.

Plants

and facilities controls are also used to transform a consumer oriented
production process into a war oriented process.

Materials control

consisted of government control over the us.es of materials for production.

Inventory controls prevented hoarding and facilitate the

movement of idle stocks of materials from one firm to one that needs
those materials.
Because production was geared towards war oriented goods at the
expense of consumer goods, demand for consumer goods skyrocketed.

To

help control this situation the government instituted direct price
controls.

These objectives were to control the overall level of prices,

and to assist in directing production into the proper channels and to
discourage it from entering into others.

The administrative action

taken by the federal government to give it this power lies in the
Emergency Control Act of 1942 which set up the Office of Price Administration.

The Act gave the Price Administration the power to put ceil-

ings on any prices that they deemed were too high.

The major advantage

of a non-controlled price system is that it has a built-in rationing

!

I
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effect.

With direct price control by government that effect is

severely limited.
Some very important observations should be noted from this wartime
experience with respect to a government directed and controlled economy.
First and most important, is that these types of controls would never
be successful in a peacetime environment.

The consumer cooperation

and sacrifice prevalent during wartime would not occur during peacetime.
Second, is the sheer immensity of the task.
and direction are needed.

Enormous amounts control

Consequently, an enormous amount of govern-

ment is needed to administer it.

In wartime there is a good reason for

this, in peacetime there is no reason.

Lastly, in peacetime especially,

price controls do not cure the evil they are set up against.

In wartime

they limit certain types of production in order to increase others,
they do not cure rising prices caused by inflation.

In a peacetime

environment control of prices will only cause shortages because no
producer will produce at a loss.
price controls in the early 1970s.

We have seen this in President Nixon's
It does not treat the cause of

inflation, it only postpones the day of reckoning by freezing prices.
So long as the supply lasts everything is fine.

Eventually shortages

will emerge because no firm will produce a product at, or below cost.
When the controls are eventually lifted out of necessity, inflation
continues because the real causes of the disease have never been
addressed.
The regulation of price whether it be minimum pricing, maximum
pricing, precise pricing, or pricing codes, only postpones the day of
reckoning.

The only control of prices that are justified are those

20

imposed to prevent monopolies, and enhance competition.

They should be

used on a much smaller scale than occurs at present.
Regulation of Transport
The impression is sometimes given by both defenders and the critics
of government's increasing regulatory role that the national government
has extended its policing activities so as to control all the important
decisions of business managementa

As one anonymous businessman phrased

it,

"It requires considerable ingenuity today to discover an area
where a businessman may exercise his judgment without referring
the decision to a government agency."9
As we travel back through time we found a solid history of the
regulation of transport by government.

It was not until the develop-

ment of the railroad industry however, that regulation began to take
on its present shape and size.
In 1867 the Granger movement began.

It originated in rural areas

with very poor economic conditions of which the railroad industry was
just one of the causes due to their failure to provide reasonable
freight rates.

Between 1871 and 1874 the states of Iowa, Illinois,

Minnesota, and Wisconsin implemented Granger laws.

All of these laws

established maximum rate limits insuring through prorata clauses that
rates would not be higher for shorter distances.

Also, railroad lines

were prevented from consolidating, and state commissions were formed
to insure the laws administration and enforcement.

These state

commissions were the forerunners of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

9Robert E. Lane, The Regulation of Businessmen, (Hamden Conn.:
Anchor Books, 1966). p. 1.

I
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These laws enjoyed only limited success, and all with the exception of
those in Illinois, were repealed.

Their major contribution was implant-

ing the idea of business regulation by commissions in the mind-set
of the people and government.

10

Through a rash of subsequent court

cases the Supreme Court backed the notion that interstate commerce was
in the jurisdiction of the federal government.
In 1887, Congress passed the Act to Regulate Commerce or more
commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Act.

This Act became the

cornerstone of federal control over domestic transportation in interstate commerce.

The Act was applicable to all railroad carriers engaged

in interstate or foreign commerce.

The provisions of the act insured

reasonable rates, pr·evented discrimination in rates, prevented undue

preference to any form of cargo, instituted a long-and-short haul clause
preventing the same rates for a short haul as for a long haul, forced
publication of rates, and created the Interstate Commerce Commission.
As a result of subsequent judicial interpretation the ICC was virtually
stripped of all authority needed to deal with the rate grievances.

The

Hepburn Act of 1906 was a renewed first step in giving the ICC real
regulatory power.

It extended its jurisdiction to cover express and

sleeping-car companies, switches, spurs, tracks, and terminal facili-

ties also.

A required detailed financial report had to be submitted

each year and the ICC possessed the power to impose maximum rates on
price.
The Transportation Act of 1920 concerned itself with the partial
transfer of railroad control back to railroad management after World

lOibid, Pegrum pp. 207-231.

22
War One.

It also legitimized power and authority by government

commission.

Pegrum sums this up with the following statement.

"Regulation, to date, had been negative nature and solely
for the purpose of protecting the shipping public. It
came to be recognized, however, that the control of private
monopoly imposed positive responsibilities on public authority, if private enterprise in railroads was to continue.
This required an extension of Commission authority over a
number of items not theretofore under its jurisdiction, in

addition the provisions of a legislative standard by which
the reasonableness of the general rate level could be
gauged." 11
In effect the ICC now controlled the actual rate setting for the
railroads, establishing a maximum 5 %. return for the first two years,
then 6% return if the ICC saw fit.

Also, the recapture clause was

created to take from those carriers who profited more than 6% due to
better efficiency etc., and put it in a general fund for weaker,
possibly less efficient lines.
minimum rates.

The commission could also establish

The ICC was to regulate quality and regularity of

service, utilization of railroad cars and locomotive specifications.

Also,no new line could be constructed without the approval of the ICC,
nor could a line be abandoned without approval of the ICC.

In effect,

you have in fact, total control of the business decisions of the railroad industry by the ICC.

12

From 1920 on, considerable legislation was passed dealing with
the regulation of transport.
objectives.

This legislation had three major

First, to remedy the existing loopholes with respect to

the regulation of the railroads.

11
Ibid, Pegrum,p, 555.
12
Ibid, Pegrum, pp. 207-231.

This was accomplished through the
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Emergency Act of 1933 and the Transportation Act of 1940.

Second, was

to lay the framework for an all encompassing national transportation
policy.

Again both the Emergency Act of 1930 and the Transportation Act

of 1940 aided in this objective.

Third, was to extend regulation much

like it was expanded to the railroads, to other agencies.

This was

accomplished through the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and the Transportation Act of 1940.
In summary, the regulation of the railroad industry began due to
the grievances of a few midwestern farmers.

It slowly grew to such a

proportion that managers were virtually only figureheads with no real
decisionmaking power.

We have seen a federal government commission

(ICC) possessing full managerial control of an industry.

The question

you must answer is, is it needed, is it justified, and does it work?

Regulation of Public Utilities
The principal industries that compose what we call public utilities
are water supply, sanitation, telegraph and telephone, electric light
and power, and natural or manufactured gas.

In all of these areas

the producer brings his product to the consumer.

Public utilities are

more tied to the local interest than say the transportation industry.
Each serves a specific geographic area.

In most cases the economies

of scale are so large and the techological requirements so high, that
entry in the area is very difficult.

You find many public utilities

sole monopolies in certain areas resulting in the close state and local
government interest in them.

Since the consumer is heavily dependent

upon the utility companies for their services, a very close connection
developed between the industry and the public interest.

There are

If!I!
1,
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four basic obligations of a utility company.
who desire service.

First, to serve all those

Second, to give adequate servide.

provide reasonable rates.

Third, to

Last, to serve without discrimination.

As stated earlier, as far as the economic structure of a utility
company is concerned, it is a monopoly.
regulation by government was imposed.

This is the major reason why
Regulation of the utility

companies developed gradually as it did with the railroad industry.
Regulation originated at the local level and only later spread to the
state government level.

Federal regulation did not appear until the

states and local governments had matters firmly under control.
The earliest regulation was that brought about by the courts in
settling disputes between consumers and producers based on common law
interpretation.

The courts took no initiative to challenge, and only

reacted as a result of a lawsuit.

State legislatives began to pass laws

in which rate and conditions of service were set forth.

These laws were

totally ineffective because they did not control public utility rates,
no control over competition, and were enforced only when brought up by
the courts.
These failures eventually caused local cities to take on the task
of regulation.

Because the utility companies used city property,

they devised a franchise type of regulation whereby the city would draw
up an agreement granting the company use of its property in return for
provisions regarding rate schedules, standards of service, accounts
and reports, and compensation.

There were many forms that the so called

franchises took depending upon the locality.
State regulation of Public Utilities by commission evolved much
in the same way as the regulation of transport.

These same federal

i

I

I
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commissions set up to regulate the railroads were mirrowed by state
regulatory commissions.

A perfect example is the California Public Utilities Commission
which consisted of five members appointed by the governor for six year
terms.

Its jurisdiction extended to every public utility that was

privately owned.

It determined the fairness of rates, as well as

ascertained the value of the property in order to assign those rates.
Required utility companies to follow a system of accountability similar
to that which was required by the ICC.

The commissioner also provided

.
.
13
a means f or consumers to seek a re d ress o f t h eir grievances.

The Federal Communications System was given the task by the
federal government to regulate public utilities in communications, as
well as radio and television.
maximum rates.

Carriers were required to file copies of all contracts,

agreements, and arrangements.
scope of powers.

It has the power to fix minimum or

It is very similar to the ICC in its

It does have special provisions to prevent encroach-

ment upon state regulatory authority.
The Federal Power Commission was created in 1920 as a compromise
between those who desired private sector development of water power
sites and those who denied public development.

In 1930, the Federal

Water Power Act strengthened the commission to the point of giving it
power to: license and supervise power projects and water power developments, have jurisdiction over interstate commerce in electrical energy

and, the regulatory power over transportation and sale of natural gas
in interstate commerce.

13 Ibid, Pegrum, pp. 596-610.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission was given the power
under the Public Utilities Act of 1938 to deal with holding company
problems in gas and electric utilities.

This was brought about

because the utilities were using the holding companies as a means to
combine.

In 1932 the three largest holding companies in the electrical

field controlled 50% of the total energy generated by privately owned
companies.

New holding companies must register with the SEC and

strict guidelines for transactions were created.

Most importantly

after 1938, holding companies were limited to a single integrated
public utility system.

While the holding companies were not destroyed,

their power and assets were extremely curtailed.
In summary, regulation of Public Utilities began at the local
level because they directly affected the public interest of the
community due to the service they, and only they, provide.

Eventually

the regulation spread to the state level via commissions.

The federal

government did not come into the picture until the local and state
levels had things under control.

There is a good relationship as to

the division of regulatory power and spheres of jurisdiction between
J

both the state and federal government.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF REGULATION
Introduction
This chapter will deal with an analysis of the impact on cost to
businesses who comply with business regulations.

Specifically, the

automobile, copper, and housing industries are briefly discussed.

First,

second, and third order effects of business regulation are analyzed with
respect to their impact on cost, growth, and efficiency of production.
Three Effects of Regulation and Their Impact on Cost
The impact on cost to both producers to include large and small
business, and consumers has been significant.

The post World War Two

regulation does not solely consist of, or is limited to, the traditional
types of regulatory agencies and have thus far discussed in this paper.
Rather, all the bureaus within government - the Department of Energy,
Justice, Interior, Education, Labor, Treasury, Transportation, Agri-

culture, and Health are involved in some type of regulation on virtual-

'
!

ly every firm in every industry.

No firm can effectively operate with-

out obeying a myriad of government restrictions and regulations.

Costs

and profits are greatly affected by these regulations, just as they are
affected by the laws of supply and demand.

Increasingly, even the basic

managerial decisions of a manager are being taken away from him in favor
of governmental influence, review, and ultimate control of the basic
decisions to be made.

Government has a voice in what lines of business

I
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a firm can enter into~

In some industries it can determine what invest-

ments can be financed and what products can be produced.

It can deter-

mine also where they will be produced and how they will be marketed
once they are produced.

And, ultimately it determines what prices can

be charged and what profits can be made.

Murry Weidenbaum describes

it this way.

"Like a hall of mirrors in which ones' every move is both
monitored and mimicked, virtually every major department
of the typical corporation in the United States has one
or more counterparts in a federal agency that controls or
strongly influences its internal decisionmaking.
The scientists incorporate research laboratories now receive

much of their guidance from lawyers in regulatory agencies
dealing with the various aspects of technological innovation.
The engineers in manufacturing departments must abide by
standards promulgated by labor Department authorities.
The scales personnel in marketing organizations must follow
procedures established by government administrators in
product safety agencies and, to a growing extent, receive
advance approval before marketing new products.
Officials deciding the location of facilities must conform
with a variety of environmental statutes.
Personal staffs are increasingly restricted by the many
executive agencies concerned with one or more aspects

of employment conditions.
The accountants and statisticians in finance departments
often bear the brunt of the rising paperwork burden being
imposed on business by government. 11 14
In response to this massive regulation, business is responding with
costly transformations and adjustments in order to react to government
demands, trying to avoid or lower the affect of the government demands,
!

trying to avoid or lower the effect of the government activity, or the

14Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Future of Business Regulation, New
York: Amacom, 1979, pp. 34-35.

i
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of businesses in terms of money

and lost time in developing, producing, and distributing new and
better goods at a relatively fair price.

An example of the adverse

affect of this regulation can be seen in the copper industry.

In

March of 1978, a study done for the Environmental Protection Agency
concluded that the \gegtiLations of the EPA will have severe repercussions on the copper industry.

The existing regulations, on top of

the uncertainty of future regulations will slow down the smelter
capacity and general new resource development of the industry.

As a

result, production would fall 25%-33%, and costs would increase 23%39% causing an increase by the nation in copper imports of 8% by 1981.
Remember that this is only the affects of a single regulation as it
.
. d ustry. 15
pertains
to one in
There are three basic effects that these and other forms of
regulation have on business.
effects.

First, is the direct or first-order

In the automobile industry for example, there was $666.00

in government mandated safety and environmental control equipment
per car.

Considering that 10 million cars were sold that year,

the regulatory price totalled $6.7 billion dollars to the auto industry.

Table 1 breaks down this cost over the years.

In 1974-78,

Congress enacted 21 regulations to increase their control over business
(See Table 2).

The 21 regulations listed in Table 2 shed some light

as to the type and scope of government regulation

15 Ibid, p. 42
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Table 1.

Increase in retail price of automobiles
due to federal requirements.

Year Of
Regulation

1968

Action

Estimated
Current Cost

Seat and shoulder belts, standards for

$ 47.84

exhaust emissions

1968-1969

Windshield defrosting systems; door latches

14.53

1969

Head restraints and accessories

27.48

1970

Reflective devices and further emission
standards

14. 77

1968-1970

Ignition locking and buzzing systems

12.75

1971

Fuel evaporative systems

28.33

1972

Improved exhaust emissions and warranty
changes; seat belt warning system

42.37

1972-1973

Exterior protection

95.29

1973

Reduced flammability materials

1969-1973

Improved side door strength

1974

Interlock system and improved exhaust

8.72
20.85
133.50

emissions

1975

Additional safety features and catalytic

146.66

converter

1976

Hydraulic brakes, improved bumpers, removal
of interlock system

41.54

1977

Leak-resistant fuel system

21.25

1978

Redesign of emossions controls
Total

Source:

Center of the Study of American Business

9.99
$665 .87
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Table 2
21 Regulations (1974-78)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)

The Toxic Substance Act
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
The Export Administration Act (imposed restrictions for Arab
boycott)
The Business Payments Abroad Act (1 million dollar fine for
bribes)
The Redlineing Disclosure Act
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act
The Antitrust Amendments of 1976
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
The Commodities Fugures and Trading Commission Act
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Securities and Exchange Amendments 1975
The Fair Marketing Practices
The United Nations Participation Act Amendment
The Saccharin Study and Labeling Act
The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977
The 1978 Amendments to the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act

Source:

Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Future of Business Regulation)

; , I'
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When we try to add up the cost of the .American taxpayer in taxes
alone it amounts to $4.8 billion dollars in FY 79 an 11.5% increase from
the $2.2 billion dollars in FY 74.

If an attempt to put a figure on the

monetary cost to business alone we come up with the following examples.
Changing regulatory requirements in the state of Colorado added $1500
to $2000 to the cost of an average new house built between 1970 and
1975.

16

These added costs were higher water and sewage fees, increased

permit fees, greater school and parkland requirements, new requirements
for wider streets, underground sewers, and environmental impact studies.

The state of New Jersey has comparible additions to the cost of housing
due to regulation, as does St. Louis.

Statistically, if the midpoint

of the range of cost estimates for housing regulation across the
nation and apply to the over 2 million new houses being built each
year, then the added cost to the buyer would amount to $4 billion
dollars a year.

. is
. Just
.
.
. d
17
Th is
in one in ustry.

There are also indirect costs or effects of regulation on business.
This is basically in the form of forcing a compnay to change its way of
doing business in order to comply with the regulations.

Examples of

this is the huge amount of needless paperwork required to be processed.
There are 4,400 different types of government regulatory forms that deal
with reports, applications, questionnaires, reply to directives, and the
preparation of appeals.

It is estimated that the total cost in the

business managers time a year amounts to 143 million manhours. 18

16
17

Ibid, pp. 14-16
Ibid, p. 16

lSibid, pp. 16-19

;), f
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Some of the government paperwork requires a sorcerer or CIA decode man
to decipher.

An example of this is in the multiple filing deadlines

for the various reporting forms required by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act depicted in Figure 1.

Another one of the indirect

effects is the effect on a firm's ability to increase production and
employment.

Dow Chemical Company maintaines that regulations delayed,

and then eventually cancelled the decision to build a $300 million
dollar petrochemical complex in California.

When they finally decided

to cancel it they had gotten only 4 of the 65 permits needed for the
project.

The EPA alone with its Environmental Impact Statement has

caused a virtual halt to nuclear energy projects in this nation.
coal industry production averaged 19.9 tones per man per day.

1976 it fell to 13.6 tones per day, a 32% drop.
in the Armco Steel Corporation.

In

Another example is

They were required to install special

scrubbers to reduce iron oxide dust.
pounds per hour of the dust.

The

It succeeded in capturing 21.2

They were powered by a 1,020 horsepower

electric motor which caused the firm's electric utility plant to spew

I
l

out 23.0 pounds per hour of sulfur and other pollutants.

.,
I[i,1·,'.,

Thus, the

air is 1.8 pounds per hour dirtier because of the government regula-

.

tions.

19

The Induced, or Third Order Costs, are the actions that business

I

takes to respond to the direct and indirect effects of regulation.
They include such responses as cutting back on new investment plants

Ii,,

involving large amounts of funds for new capital formation.

'

19 b"d
I i. , pp. 14 - 25 •

These

'
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regulations lay claim to resources that would otherwise be spent or
used for new investments, increased growth, or new research and development.

Innovation and scientific progress in all business fields have

to be slowed due to the requirement to adhere to these regulations.
There is a decrease in the rate of introduction of new products and
improved production processes.

A lot of new innovations, methods, etc.,

are disapproved by industry due to the cost of compliance with government regulation, which otherwise could increase production, efficiency,
1,

and growth of the firm.

Tables 3 and 4 quantify the actual administra-

"'

1,; !

tive and compliance cost of government regulation on business.
W.O. Douglas best summarizes this section on the analysis of
regulation on business when he stated.
"The might and power of the Federal Government have no equal. .•
Men of goodwill, not evil ones only, invest, under feeling of
urgency, new and different procedures that have an awful effect

,,,

I

on the citizen. u20

•'!'"
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ZOibid, p. 11.
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Table 3. Annual cost of federal regulation, by
area, 1976 (millions of dollars).
Administrative
Cost

Area

Compliance
Cost

\

Total

$1,516

$5,094

$ 5,510

Job Safety and working conditions

483

4,015

4,498

Energy and the environment

612

7,760

8,372

Financial regulation

104

1,118

1,222

Industry specific

484

19,919

20,403

*

25,000

25,000

$62,906

$66,105

Consumer safety and health

Paperwork

$3,199

Total

* Included in other categories
Source:

Center for the Study of American Business

Table 4.

Estimated cost of federal regulation of business
(Fiscal years, in billions of dollars).

Administrative costs
Compliance costs
Total
Source:

J

1977

1978

1979

$ 3.7

$ 4.5

$ 4.8

75.4

92.2

97.9

$79.1

$96. 7

$102.7

Center for the Study of American Business

i;fi:i

CHAPTER FIVE
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SUMMARY, ALTERNATIVES, AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
The problem to be analyzed in this paper is one concerning how to
assure that government regulation is limited to that which is necessary
and beneficial.

This paper is basically a synopsis of business regula-

tion from its infancy through the Post World War II period.

Included

in this synopsis is the legal foundations of regulation based on Common
Law, the inherent powers of the government, and judicial support and
restraint of business regulation.

The overall need for business regula-

tion to include the enhancement of competition, limiting growth of
monopolies, and the control and correction of business and market
imperfections was also discussed.

An outline of the infancy of

business regulation was stated which basically deals with the Antitrust
Laws.

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was described with respect

to its broad foundation in statutory business regulations.

The

Clayton Act of 1914 attempted to eliminate the growth of monopolies
by eliminating price discrimination.

The Kefauvre-Cellar Act of

1950 further restricted the advent of monopolies by restricting the
types of mergers that could take place.

The enforcement of the

antitrust laws were initially left to the courts through case interpretations, finally the Federal Trade Commission was created and given
broad powers to enforce the antitrust laws.

'

;
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The main bulk of the paper consisted of price, transport, and
public utilities regulation, in the United States.

Price regulation

has the same basic objective of the antitrust laws which is to
enhance the chances of maximum competition through preventing monopolies, and promoting the maximum effeciency of the allocation of resources.
Maximum, minimum, and precise price fixing were discussed in relation

to their affect on the producer and the consumer.

The National Indus-

trial Recovery Act of 1933 was analyzed along with the National
Recovery Administration and its codes of fair competition which were
severe price regulations in the form of minimum and maximum price

fixing.

War time price regulation took on the expanded form of

minimum and maximum prices to transform the productive process to a

war footing.

With respect to transport regulation the discussion

centered on regulation of the railroad industry.

Beginning with the

early Granger Laws in the midwestern states and culminating in the
Interstate Commerce Commission the regulation of the railroad indsutry
was analyzed in depth.

The regulation of public utilities was con-

cerned with its unique situation of a desired monopoly.

Emphasis was

placed on the state and local regulatory control of these industries.
Chapter four of the paper covered the three basic effects of
regulation on business.

Direct or First Order effects are the

direct impact on cost that the regulations have on industry.

Indirect

Costs or Effects of regulation are those that face a company to change
its best and most efficient means of doing business.

An example of

this is the regulatory paperwork required to comply with various
regulations.

Indirect or Third Order Costs or Effects are actions

that businesses take to respond to these indirect effects of regulation.

""'
.
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They include such responses as the cutback in research and development,
plant expansion, and new capital formation.
Alternatives
There are two practical alternatives to the problem of business
overregulation.

First, business can do nothing but accept the reality

and cooperate as a partner with government.

Second, they can satisfice,

or grudgingly comply with minimal regulatory requirements while privately working behind the scenes to change the present situation.

Each

manager must consider each alternative and choose what he considers to
be the best alternative.
Conclusion
There is considerable concern over the question of whether modern
business will survive in the future.

This paper has shown the slow

evolution of business regulation in the 1800s and described its manifestation as seen through modern day business regulation.

Its intent

has been expanded from one of providing and insuring an environment
where competition will flourish, to one of benevolent government
control whereby government decides when a firm can compete, how it
can compete, and in some cases if it can compete.

Providing a

competitive environment is one thing, but forcefully taking a direct
or indirect part in the decisionmaking process of a firm is not
warranted.
Government, especially at the federal level, through unneeded
costly regulations, unnecessary paperwork, and inflated interpretations
of the law is choking the very life from our free enterprise system.
The business producers are increasingly coming under the control of

I,I
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the government non-producers.

The inherent genius of the free

enterprise system is that it allows an intelligent entreprenour to
seek out and develop the most profitable means of performing a certain
business action which in most cases is the least costly, most efficient,
and of most effective means of doing business.

Needless regulation

unnecessarily increases costs, stifles growth and investment, and
inhibits efficiency and maximum production.

This trend away from

the precepts of the free enterprise system to one of increasing
government interference should be stopped.

We need only to look on

the economic lesson of Great Britain to find ou;ti: inevitable fate if
our present course remains unchanged.

'I,
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